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Clerk of the Court 
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400 Midtown Plaza 
230 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Re: Letter of Correction for State v. 
William Horton, No. 920245-CA 
Dear Ms. Noonan: 
The State filed its brief in the above named case last 
week. A colleague, Mr. David B. Thompson, recently read my brief 
and noticed that I made a mistake in paragraph 5 of the standard 
of review section. That paragraph now reads: 
5. Did the trial court properly refuse 
to admit into evidence defendant's proposed 
exhibit number 24, a photograph of the trunk 
of defendant's wife's vehicle, which was used 
to transport the stolen property in various 
burglaries? A trial court's decision to 
admit or not admit evidence will not be 
reversed on appeal absent an abuse of 
discretion. Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781 n.3. 
(Br. of the State at 2-3) (emphasis added). 
The last sentence of paragraph 5 should read: 
A trial court's decision to admit or not 
admit evidence is reviewed under a correction 
of error standard. Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781 
n.3. 
I request that the Court be made aware of my mistake 
and this letter of correction. I also apologize for any 
confusion my mistake may have caused the Court or opposing 
counsel. 
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attorney, Alan M. Williams. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 920245-CA 
v. : Priority No. 2 
WILLIAM GENE HORTON, : 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from the Eighth Judicial District 
Court in and for Uintah County, State of Utah, the Honorable A. 
Lynn Payne, presiding. This Court has jurisdiction to hear the 
appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1992). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The following issues are presented on appeal: 
1. Did the affidavit in support of the search warrant 
establish probable cause? When a search warrant is challenged as 
having been issued without an adequate showing of probable cause, 
the reviewing court does not conduct a de novo review of the 
magistrate's probable cause determination; instead, the reviewing 
court determines only whether the magistrate had a substantial 
basis for concluding that probable cause existed. State v, 
Babbell, 770 P.2d 987, 991 (Utah 1989). See also State v. 
Weaver, 817 P.2d 830, 833 (Utah App. 1991) (reviewing court 
should pay "great deference" to the magistrate's decision), 
2. Assuming the search warrant was technically 
defective, did the trial court properly admit the evidence seized 
from defendant's residence on the basis that the officers who 
conducted the search reasonably relied on that warrant? This 
Court will review de novo the question of whether an officer 
acted in good faith reliance on a search warrant. State v. Rowe, 
806 P.2d 730, 738 (Utah App.), cert, granted, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 
1991). 
3. Did the trial court properly refuse to admit into 
evidence the affidavit of Harmon Meinhart, a deceased witness who 
would have testified on behalf of defendant? This Court reviews 
a trial judge's decision to exclude evidence at trials under an 
correction of error standard. State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 
781 n.3 (Utah 1991) ("Whether a piece of evidence is admissible 
is a question of law, and we always review questions of law under 
a correctness standard."). 
4. Did the trial court properly refuse to grant 
defendant's motion to continue the trial until one of defendant's 
witnesses, Clara Eva Meinhart, would be available to testify in 
person instead of by deposition? The decision whether to grant 
or deny a continuance is within the discretion of the trial court 
and will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear abuse of that 
discretion. State v. Oliver, 820 P.2d 474, 476 (Utah App. 1991). 
5. Did the trial court properly refuse to admit into 
evidence defendant's proposed exhibit number 24, a photograph of 
the trunk of defendant's wife's vehicle, which was used to 
transport the property stolen in various burglaries? A trial 
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court's decision to admit or not admit evidence will not be 
reversed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. Ramirez, 817 
P.2d at 781 n.3. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The applicable constitutional provisions, statutes and 
rules for a determination of this case are included in the text 
of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by information with multiple 
counts of theft and burglary stemming from the burglaries of 
several businesses located in the area of Vernal/ Utah (R. 2-4). 
The original information charged defendant as follows: 
Count I, Theft, a second degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1990); 
Count II, Burglary of a Non-Dwelling, a third degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-202 (1990); 
Count III, Burglary of a Non-Dwelling, a third degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1990); 
Count IV, Theft, a third degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-404 (1990); 
Count V, Burglary of a Non-Dwelling, a third degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1990); 
Count VI, Theft, a third degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-404 (1990); 
Count VII, Burglary of a Non-Dwelling, a third degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1990); 
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Count VIII, Theft, a third degree felony, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1990); 
Count IX, Burglary of a Non-Dwelling, a third degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1990); and 
Count X, Theft, a second degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1990) (R. 2-4). 
Following a preliminary hearing, defendant was bound 
over for trial on all counts, except that count one, which also 
had alleged that defendant was a habitual criminal, was amended 
to delete that charge. Also, count six was amended to reflect a 
charge of theft, a class B misdemeanor. 
After defendant was arraigned, counts one and two, 
which involved a burglary at a "Wilkerson's" store in Duchesne 
County, were severed from counts three through ten, which 
involved burglaries that occurred at other locations on a 
different date. Separate trials were then scheduled. In the 
first trial, defendant was acquitted on counts one and two. 
Consequently, this appeal does not involve the charges alleged in 
counts one and two of the information. 
At the trial on counts three through ten, a mistrial 
was declared. Trial was re-scheduled, but was continued because 
one of defendant's alibi witnesses underwent surgery and was 
unavailable to testify. Defendant moved for an additional 
continuance based on the claim that his witness needed additional 
time to recover from her surgery (R. 165-67J. The trial court 
refused to grant a further continuance and ordered that the 
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witness be deposed and her testimony read to the jury at trial 
(R. 168). A trial was then held on counts three through ten, and 
a jury convicted defendant on all counts as charged. The trial 
court sentenced defendant to one term of one to fifteen years and 
six terms of zero to five years at the Utah State Prison, the 
sentences to run consecutively. Defendant was also sentenced to 
one term of zero to six months at the Utah State Prison, that 
sentence to run concurrently with defendant's other sentences (R. 
291-93). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS1 
During the night of Father's Day, Sunday, June 16, 
1991, or in the early morning hours of June 17th, defendant and 
Brian Winslow, his accomplice and codefendant, burglarized the 
Money Savers store in Maeser, Utah, near Vernal (R. 826-27). 
Defendant and Winslow entered the building by pushing in an air 
conditioning unit that was installed in the wall, and then 
crawling through the hole (R. 826, 1022). The two took several 
cartons of popular-brand cigarettes, packages of meat, and other 
assorted items (R. 831-34, 839-42, 1023-25). 
On the same night or early morning, defendant and 
Winslow also broke into the Dinah Bowl building. The Dinah Bowl 
building houses three separate businesses, all of which were 
burglarized (R. 319, 847, 860, 870). Defendant and Winslow 
entered the Dinah Bowl building from the roof by removing a 
1
 The State recites the facts in the light most favorable to 
the jury's verdict. State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 117 (Utah 
1989); see also State v. Moore, 782 P.2d 497, 501 (Utah 1989). 
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nailed sheet of plywood that covered an old air conditioning 
hole, and then entering through the hole (R. 338, 1029). From 
the Dinah Bowl bowling alley, defendant and Winslow stole a grey 
Denver Broncos bag used for carrying a bowling ball and other 
items (R. 368). From the Acute Cut beauty salon, defendant and 
Winslow took leather purses and other items (R. 1034-45). And 
from the Dinah Barber Salon defendant and Winslow took some 
scissors and petty cash (R. 395). In addition to stealing 
assorted property, defendant threw a bowling ball through a glass 
door and generally destroyed property in the Acute Cut salon (R. 
860, 900, 1034). 
Detective Joe Boren of the Vernal City Police 
department investigated the Dinah Bowl burglary the next morning 
(R. 318-19, 895). He videotaped the crime scene and recovered 
two distinct shoe patterns in the area below the suspected point 
of entry from the roof (R. 897-899). Boren inspected the plywood 
that was originally nailed over the old air conditioning hole. 
He did not believe that defendant and Winslow could get the 
plywood up without the use of tools (R. 901). Boren did not 
detect any usable fingerprints; however, burglars often use 
gloves and therefore do not leave prints (R. 903, 1027). 
During the course of his investigation of the Dinah 
Bowl burglaries, Boren checked with Detective Wayne Hollebeke of 
the Uintah County Sheriff's office to determine if any crimes 
Hollebeke was investigating had the same modus operandi as the 
Dinah Bowl burglary (R. 325-26). The two officers determined 
6 
that there were several similarities between two burglaries of 
Money Savers that occurred on May 26, 1991 and June 16, 1991, 
and the June 16th burglary of the Dinah Bowl. The similarities 
included the method of entry, the time of occurrence (both over 
holiday weekends), the targets were all businesses, the 
footprints taken from the Money Savers burglary appeared to match 
those footprints found in the bowling alley, and more than one 
person was involved in each burglary (R. 323, 521, 654, 658). 
On the morning of July 8, 1991, Boren received a phone 
call at his office in the police department from an informant 
(Search Warrant Affidavit at 4, hereinafter, "Aff." ).2 The 
caller identified him or herself by name, but requested that his 
or her identity remain confidential (jLd.; R. 638-39). The 
informant asked whether there had been a recent burglary at a 
bowling alley in Vernal. Boren confirmed that there had been. 
The caller next asked whether there had been a burglary in 
Duchesne in which VCR's were taken. Boren replied that he did 
not know, and that he would have to find out (R. 640). The 
caller then informed Boren that he or she overheard a 
conversation between William and Vickie Horton in which defendant 
mentioned that some VCR's were taken out of a business in 
Duchesne, and that he, the defendant, had broken into the bowling 
2
 The State filed a motion to have the search warrant 
affidavit made part of the record on appeal. As of the time of 
filing, however, the State's motion had not yet been ruled upon. 
Nevertheless, a copy of the affidavit is attached hereto as 
Addendum A. The page numbering on the affidavit was added by the 
State for ease of reference. 
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alley in Vernal (Aff. at 5). The caller told Boren defendant's 
approximate age, exact address in Salt Lake City, a description 
of the car used in the burglaries, as well as its license plate 
number, and that defendant had a criminal record (id.. ). 
After the conversation with the informant, Boren called 
the Duchesne County Sheriff's office and spoke with Rick Harris. 
Harris told Boren that the Wilkerson store in Duchesne had been 
burglarized and some VCR's were stolen (id.)* Boren also 
verified defendant's address and criminal record (Aff. at 6). 
At about 1:00 p.m., the informant called again. This 
time the informant stated that "the suspect had been in 
possession of several boxes of video tapes, Nintendo games, some 
VCR's and several boxes of packaged meat" (id..). The informant 
also stated that defendant "had been selling lots of cartons of 
Marlboro cigarettes" (.id.)* The informant stated that a person 
from Vernal may have been involved in the burglaries, and that he 
or she would call back if he or she were able to obtain more 
information (id..). 
At about 4:00 p.m. on the same day, the informant 
called a third time and told Boren that the name of the person 
from Vernal who may have committed the crimes with defendant was 
"Steven." (Aff. at 6). The informant also stated that "Steven" 
lived in Vernal and had been in prison with defendant. The 
caller described "Steven" as blonde, stocky build, married, and 
having one child (id.). 
At about 10:30 p.m., the informant called Boren at his 
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residence. The informant stated that the person in Vernal was 
named "Brian," not Steven. The informant further stated that 
Brian had been released from prison just six months ago (Aff. at 
7). 
At some point during these conversation, the informant 
told Boren that he or she saw defendant in the driveway of 
defendant's home trying to sell stolen cigarettes to defendant's 
father-in-law. The informant also said that he or she watched as 
"packaged meats [were] taken into the house" (R. 642-43). 
The next day, July 9th, Boren contacted Brent Cardall 
of the Department of Corrections. Cardall reported that he had 
only two people with the first name of Brian listed in his 
office; one in California and Brian Winslow in Vernal. Cardall 
described Winslow as blonde, stocky build, married, and having 
one child approximately six months old (R. 286). 
Using the information provided by the caller, Boren 
prepared an affidavit to request a search warrant for defendant's 
residence. At the time, Boren knew the informant did not want to 
be identified because of fear of retaliation from defendant. 
Consequently, Boren omitted some of the detailed information that 
the informant had provided him so that defendant would be unable 
to discern the informant's identity (R. 290). 
When Officer Boren arrived in Salt Lake on the morning 
of July 10th, the Salt Lake County Attorney's office reviewed the 
search warrant affidavit before allowing Boren to present it to a 
magistrate (R. 645). After reading the affidavit, the magistrate 
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issued the requested search warrant (.id.)* Boren, accompanied by 
other officers, executed the search at defendant's residence. 
There they recovered several items that had been stolen from the 
Dinah Bowl and the Acute Cut, including two towels with the words 
"Dinah Bowl" and a picture of a dinosaur on them (R. 323, 906-
07), a grey Denver Broncos bowling ball bag (R. 322), several 
leather purses and other items (R. 325, 1034-35). 
The police also found a blue nylon gym bag, a green 
army duffel bag and a nylon feed bag that contained bolt cutters, 
a nylon rope with a knot tied every foot to foot and one half, 
two crowbars, plastic gloves, a flashlight, large screwdrivers, a 
20 pound sledgehammer and pipe cutters. Boren testified that he 
and the other officers believed that the items were burglary 
tools (R. 427-29, 676-80, 910-11). 
At trial, Brian Winslow testified for the State. 
Winslow stated that defendant and defendant's wife were at his 
residence in Vernal waiting for him when he arrived home from 
work at 6:00 or 7:00 p.m. on June 16th (R. 1019). According to 
Winslow, he and defendant burglarized Money Savers and the Dinah 
Bowl businesses on the night of June 16, 1991 (R. 1020-26, 1029-
30). Winslow also testified that defendant carried his burglary 
tools in a bag, and that both he and defendant wore gloves during 
the burglary (R. 1027-28). 
Winslow's wife also testified that defendant and his 
wife arrived at the Winslow residence in Vernal on June 16, 1991, 
at about 6:00 or 7:00 p.m. (R. 1086-87). 
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Defendant attempted to rebut Winslow's testimony by 
producing four alibi witnesses. Jay Bringhurst, a friend of 
defendant, Vickie Horton, defendant's wife, and Rachelle Schow, 
defendant's stepdaughter, all testified that they spent the day 
together in East Canyon and returned to Salt Lake at about 10:00 
or 11:00 p.m. (R. 1110-12, 1120-21, 1134-35). Mrs. Meinhart, 
defendant's mother-in-law, whose home is adjacent to defendant's 
home, testified in a deposition that she saw defendant and his 
wife in Salt Lake City at about 10:30 p.m. on June 16th (R. 1143, 
1150, 1153). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court properly denied defendant's motion to 
suppress evidence obtained pursuant to the search warrant because 
the supporting affidavit established probable cause. Even if the 
warrant were deemed defective, the trial court properly admitted 
the evidence seized at defendant's residence because Detective 
Boren reasonably relied on the warrant when searching defendant's 
residence. 
The trial court did not err when it refused to admit 
the affidavit of Harmon Meinhart under the residual hearsay 
exception. Defendant sought its admission to establish an alibi. 
However, defendant also presented similar testimony from four 
other alibi witnesses. Consequently, the affidavit was 
inadmissible under rule 804(b)(5) Utah Rules of Evidence, because 
it was not more probative on the point for which it was offered 
than any other evidence that defendant could procure. 
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Similarly, the trial court did not err by refusing to 
admit the photograph of the trunk of the vehicle allegedly used 
to transport the stolen property. The photograph was taken by 
defendant's wife and contained no verifiable scale of 
measurement. Defendant claimed that a hubcap that was propped up 
inside the trunk was fourteen inches in diameter. However, 
because the bottom portion of the hubcap was not visible in the 
photograph, it was impossible to verify whether it was resting on 
the floor of the trunk or on some other object inside the trunk. 
Under the circumstances, the reliability of the photograph was 
dubious, and the trial court properly refused to admit the 
photograph into evidence. 
Also, the trial court acted well within its discretion 
when it refused to grant defendant's motion for a continuance 
based on his claim that an alibi witness would be unavailable for 
trial. Specifically, defendant asserted that his mother-in-law, 
Clara Eva Meinhart, was scheduled to undergo surgery at the time 
of trial. Defendant provided a letter from Meinhart's physician 
in which her physician indicated that Meinhart would need "a 
recovery time of eight weeks due to the delicate nature of this 
surgery" and "a complete recovery time of a period of six months" 
(R. 167). Given the uncertainty in how long it would take 
Meinhart to sufficiently recover, and the length of the delay, 
the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying 
defendant's motion. At any rate, the witness was deposed and her 
testimony was read to the jury. Consequently, even if the court 
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abused its discretion by refusing to continue defendant's trial, 
that error was harmless. 
Finally, the trial court did violate Utah Code Ann. 
S 76-3-401 (1990) by sentencing defendant to consecutive terms of 
imprisonment that totalled more than thirty years. As this Court 
made clear in State v. Swapp, 808 P.2d 115 (Utah App.), cert. 
denied, 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991), § 76-3-401 does not prohibit 
the imposition of such a sentence, it merely limits the number of 
years served to no more than thirty. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
BY REVIEWING THE SEARCH WARRANT AND ITS 
ACCOMPANYING AFFIDAVIT DE NOVO, THE TRIAL 
COURT FAILED TO "PAY GREAT DEFERENCE" TO THE 
ISSUING MAGISTRATE'S FINDING OF PROBABLE 
CAUSE. THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE TRIAL 
COURT'S RULING ON THIS POINT AND UPHOLD THE 
MAGISTRATE'S FINDING OF PROBABLE CAUSE. 
The trial court erred when it concluded that the 
affidavit supporting the request for a search warrant failed to 
establish probable cause. (A copy of the trial court's findings 
of fact and conclusions of law is attached hereto as Addendum B.) 
More specifically, the trial court appears to have conducted a de 
novo review of the affidavit, and, in so doing, it failed to pay 
appropriate deference to the magistrate's probable cause 
determination. As demonstrated below, when reviewed with the 
proper degree of deference, the magistrate's probable cause 
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determination should be upheld.3 
It is well-established that a magistrate's probable 
cause determination is deferentially reviewed, and reversed only 
if it is clearly erroneous; that is, only if it had no 
"substantial basis." State v. Babbell, 770 P.2d 987, 990-91 
(Utah 1989); State v. Purser, 182 Utah Adv. Rep. 28, 29-30 (Utah 
App. March 11, 1992). Accord United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 
897, 914-15, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 3416 (1984). See also State v. 
Weaver, 817 P.2d 830, 833 (Utah App. 1991) ("In reviewing the 
magistrate's determination of the sufficiency of the affidavit, 
we are obliged to pay great deference to the finding of probable 
cause and we do not make a de novo review.") (citations omitted). 
Stated differently, 
[w]hen an issue is raised . . . as to whether 
an affidavit contains sufficient facts to 
find probable cause for issuance of a search 
warrant, the reviewing court is not required 
to conduct a de novo review of the 
magistrate's determination. The reviewing 
court need only determine whether the issuing 
magistrate had a substantial basis for 
concluding that there were enough facts 
within the affidavit to find that probable 
cause existed. It is within a magistrate's 
discretion to construe ambiguity within an 
affidavit. 
State v. Collard, 810 P.2d 884, 885-86 (Utah App.), cert, denied. 
3
 Although the trial court denied defendant's motion to 
suppress based on the good faith exception to the exclusionary 
rule, this Court may affirm the trial court's ruling on any 
proper ground. State v. Bryan, 709 P.2d 257, 260 (Utah 1985) 
("[T]his Court may affirm the trial court's decision on any 
proper grounds, even though the trial court assigned another 
reason for its ruling."). Consequently, the State reasserts its 
argument advanced below that the affidavit, reviewed under the 
appropriate standard, established probable cause. 
14 
817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991) (citations omitted). 
Moreover, the existence of probable cause is determined 
based on the totality of the circumstances. Leon, 468 U.S. at 
914-15, 104 S. Ct. at 3416; Weaver, 817 P.2d at 832. Under the 
totality of the circumstances analysis, the magistrate must 
make a practical, common-sense decision 
whether, given all of the circumstances set 
forth in the affidavit before him, including 
the "veracity" and basis of knowledge of 
persons supplying hearsay information, there 
is a fair probability that contraband or 
evidence of a crime will be found in a 
particular place. 
Weaver, 817 P.2d at 832-33 (citations omitted). See also United 
States v. Dill, 693 F.2d 1012, 1014 (10th Cir. 1982) ("Probable 
cause is nothing more than a reasonable belief that the evidence 
sought is located at the place indicated by the policeman's 
affidavit.") (quoted with approval in Weaver, 817 P.2d at 833). 
As such, the question that the issuing magistrate had 
to address was whether the affidavit, read as a whole, 
demonstrated a reasonable belief that the evidence sought was 
located at defendant's residence. The State concedes on appeal, 
as it did below, that there is no express statement in the 
affidavit that the informant saw the stolen property at 
defendant's residence. However, a common-sense reading of the 
affidavit as a whole, allowing for the magistrate's discretion to 
construe ambiguities in the affidavit, supports its finding of 
probable cause. This is especially true when the magistrate's 
probable cause determination is deferentially reviewed, instead 
of being reviewed de novo as the trial court appears to have done 
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in this case. 
According to the affidavit, Boren received a telephone 
call from an informant who wished to remain anonymous out of fear 
of retaliation. The caller stated that he or she had overheard a 
conversation between defendant and defendant's wife in which the 
defendant said that he had broken into the Vernal Bowling Alley 
as well as something about VCR's taken from a business in 
Duchesne. The caller also provided detailed information about 
defendant — his approximate agef criminal history, the make and 
model of the car that was used in the burglaries and its license 
plate, and defendant's address. 
Boren corroborated all of the information provided by 
the caller through independent investigation. Later that same 
day, the informant called Boren and reported that defendant 
had been in possession of several boxes of videotapes, Nintendo 
games, some VCR's and several boxes of packaged meat. The caller 
also stated defendant "had been selling lots of cartons of 
Marlboro cigarettes" (Aff. at 6). All of these items matched 
descriptions of items stolen in the recent burglaries in Vernal 
and Duchesne identified by the informant. 
Given the quantity of stolen property itemized by Boren 
in the affidavit4 and the nature of those materials — 
especially the packaged meat and other food items, as well as the 
A
 As a review of the affidavit indicates, Det. Boren 
carefully itemized the stolen items, even going so far as to 
identify individual videotapes and Nintendo games by their titles 
and providing the probable packaging dates on the packaged meats 
(Aff. at 2-4). 
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fact that the only address in the warrant was that of defendant's 
residence as provided by the informant, it was reasonable for the 
magistrate to infer that the informant's observations had been of 
defendant at his residence. The trial court recognized this 
possible interpretation of the affidavit, but countered that 
because the affidavit was ambiguous, it was also possible to 
infer that the stolen property was being distributed from 
defendant's vehicle (R. 630). However, as the State argued 
below, 
The only mention of selling of items were 
cartons of cigarettes. The rest was just in 
possession, including VCR's. Again, common 
sense [indicates that] people don't keep 
VCR's, . . . several packages of meat, [and] 
Nintendo games [in their cars]. These are 
items that are routinely kept at home. And I 
would submit that reading it that way is a 
reasonable conclusion that the magistrate had 
a substantial basis to conclude that the 
items were at the property, were at the 
residence provided, and that the informant — 
the informant, by supplying the residence, 
also supplied the location the property would 
be found. Therefore, it's the State's 
position that in reading this affidavit as a 
whole, it's the only conclusion the 
magistrate could have arrived at and, 
therefore, was just in granting a search 
warrant for the home. 
(R. 630-31). 
Whether the affidavit in the instant case was 
sufficient to establish probable cause to search defendant's 
house is, as were similar issues in Babbell and Collard, a very 
close question. However, under the totality of the 
circumstances, the issuing magistrate could have reasonably 
determined that there was "a fair probability" that the evidence 
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sought was at defendant's residence. 
While the affidavit could have been more artfully 
drafted, see Babbell, 770 P.2d at 992 n.3, a reviewing court must 
consider an affidavit "'in its entirety and in a common-sense 
fashion,'" id. at 991 (quoting State v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099, 
1102 (Utah 1985)), and recognize that "affidavits 'are normally 
drafted by nonlawyers in the midst and haste of a criminal 
investigation5 [and that] [t]echnical requirements of elaborate 
specificity once exacted under common law pleadings have no 
proper place in this area.'" Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 233, 
235 (1983) (quoting United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108 
(1965)). As also stated in Gates: 
[W]e have repeatedly said that after-
the-fact scrutiny by courts of the 
sufficiency of the affidavit should not take 
the form of de novo review. A magistrate's 
"determination of probable cause should be 
paid great deference by reviewing courts." 
Spinelli Tv. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 
419, 89 S. Ct. 584, 590 (1969)]. "A grudging 
or negative attitude by reviewing courts 
toward warrants," Ventresca, 380 U.S., at 
108, is inconsistent with the Fourth 
Amendment's strong preference for searches 
conducted pursuant to a warrant; "courts 
should not invalidate warrantfs] by 
interpreting affidavitfs] in a 
hypertechnical, rather than commonsense 
5
 Indeed, in this case, Boren prepared the affidavit between 
the hours of 10 p.m. and 2 a.m. while other officers maintained 
surveillance on Winslow's house and the Money Savers store in 
Maeser, Utah. At the same time, three or four other officers 
went back and forth from the surveillance scenes as additional 
information was gathered for other affidavits. Boren wanted to 
serve the warrant as soon as possible the next day and planned to 
go to Salt Lake City to try to get the warrant issued. He did 
not request either a nighttime search or no-knock authorization 
(R. 643-44, 655). 
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manner." Jjd., at 109 . 
We also have said that "[a]lthough in a 
particular case it may not be easy to 
determine when an affidavit demonstrates the 
existence of probable cause, the resolution 
of doubtful or marginal cases in this area 
should be largely determined by the 
preference to be accorded to warrants,,f 
United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 109 
(1985). This reflects both a cissire to 
encourage use of the warrant process by 
police officers and a recognition that once a 
warrant has been obtained, intrusion upon 
interests protected by the Fourth Amendment 
is less severe than otherwise may be the 
case. 
462 U.S. at 236, 237 n. 10. See also Babbell, 770 P.2d at 990-
91; Collard, 810 P.2d at 886; Weaver, 817 P.2d at 833 (adopting 
same considerations)• 
Although admittedly a very close question, the issuing 
magistrate reasonably found that the affidavit established 
probable cause. By refusing to construe the ambiguous statements 
in the affidavit in keeping with the magistrate's finding of 
probable cause, the trial court effectively reviewed the 
magistrate's probable cause finding de novo. The trial court 
should not have engaged in that analysis. Rather, given that the 
trial court recognized that the magistrate could have construed 
the affidavit in the manner suggested by the State, it should 
have deferred to the magistrate's finding of probable cause. Had 
the trial court paid the magistrate's determination of probable 
cause the great deference it was due pursuant to both federal and 
Utah precedent, it would have upheld that determination. This 
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Court should therefore uphold the trial court's denial of 
defendant's motion to suppress, but on the ground that the 
affidavit did establish probable cause. 
POINT II 
EVEN IF THE SEARCH WARRANT WAS DEFECTIVE, THE 
TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED THE EVIDENCE 
SEIZED FROM DEFENDANT'S RESIDENCE BECAUSE 
DETECTIVE BOREN'S RELIANCE ON THE WARRANT WAS 
REASONABLE. 
Even if this Court were to determine that the affidavit 
did not provide the magistrate with an adequate basis for 
determining that probable cause existed, the trial court properly 
admitted the evidence seized under the good faith exception to 
the exclusionary rule enunciated in United States v. Leon, 468 
U.S. 897, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984)- In reviewing a trial court's 
determination of good faith reliance, this Court conducts a de 
novo review. State v. Rowe, 806 P.2d 730, 738 (Utah App.), cert. 
granted, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991). As demonstrated belowf the 
trial court correctly determined that Boren's reliance on the 
warrant was reasonable. 
In Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), the United States 
Supreme Court held that federal constitutional guarantees against 
unlawful search and seizure required exclusion of illegally 
obtained evidence in state criminal trials. However, in Leon the 
Court carved out a "good faith" exception to that exclusionary 
rule, ,fhold[ing] that evidence obtained in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment by officers acting in objectively reasonable 
reliance on a search warrant issued by a neutral and detached 
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magistrate need not be excluded, as a matter of federal law, from 
the case in chief of federal and state criminal prosecutions." 
Leon, 468 U.S. at 927 (Blackmun, J., concurring).6 
In Leon, the Court stated: 
We conclude that the marginal or 
nonexistent benefits produced by suppressing 
evidence obtained in objectively reasonable 
reliance on a subsequently invalidated search 
warrant cannot justify the substantial costs 
of exclusion. We do not suggest, however, 
that exclusion is always inappropriate in 
cases where an officer has obtained a warrant 
and abided by its terms. "[S]earches 
6
 Defendant purports to base his claim on both the federal 
and state constitution. However, defendant did not properly 
develop a state constitutional argument below. Indeed, defendant 
concedes that the applicability of the "good faith" exception 
under the Utah Constitution was not briefed before the trial 
court, but asserts that it was "discussed in open court and 
presumably was considered in the trial court's decision." (Br. 
of Appellant at 12) Defendant's assertion is incorrect. The 
only discussion about whether the good faith exception was 
applicable under the Utah Constitution centered around the fact 
that the issue had yet to be addressed by either this Court or 
the Utah Supreme Court (R. 634-46). Despite the trial court's 
assertion the issue was unsettled, defendant never attempted to 
explain why a different standard should be adopted under the Utah 
Constitution than that provided under the Fourth Amendment. 
Consequently, defendant's state constitutional argument was not 
properly preserved below and should not be addressed for the 
first time on appeal. State v. Buford, 820 P.2d 1381, 1384 (Utah 
App. 1991) ("Even though the Utah Constitution is subject to 
independent analysis, argument for such interpretation generally 
should begin in the trial court."). See also. State v. Miller, 
829 P.2d 132, 135 (Utah App. 1992); State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268, 
1273 (Utah App. 1990); State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 327-28 
(Utah App. 1989) (same position as Buford). 
Moreover, even on appeal, defendant has failed to 
develop a distinct state constitutional analysis. This Court 
should therefore consider defendant's claim based solely on 
federal grounds. See State v. Collard, 810 P.2d 884, 885 n.2 
(Utah App. 1991) (Utah appellate courts "will not engage in a 
state constitutional analysis unless a party briefs a different 
analysis under the state constitution than that which flows from 
the federal Constitution."); State v. Barela, 779 P.2d 1140, 1142 
n.l (Utah App. 1989). 
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pursuant to a warrant will rarely require any 
deep inquiry into reasonableness," Illinois 
v. Gates, 462 U.S., at 267 (White, J., 
concurring in judgment), for "a warrant 
issued by a magistrate normally suffices to 
establish" that a law enforcement officer has 
"acted in good faith in conducting the 
search." United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 
798, 823, n.32 (1982). Nevertheless, the 
officer's reliance on the magistrate's 
probable-cause determination and on the 
technical sufficiency of the warrant he 
issues must be objectively reasonable, cf. 
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815-19 
(1982), and it is clear that in some 
circumstances the officer will have no 
reasonable grounds for believing that the 
warrant was properly issued. 
Suppression therefore remains an 
appropriate remedy if the magistrate or judge 
in issuing a warrant was misled by 
information in an affidavit that the affiant 
knew was false or would have known was false 
except for his reckless disregard of the 
truth. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 
(1978). The exception we recognize today 
will also not apply in cases where the 
issuing magistrate wholly abandoned his 
judicial role in the manner condemned in Lo-
Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319 
(1979); in such circumstances, no reasonably 
well trained officer should rely on the 
warrant. Nor would an officer manifest 
objective good faith in relying on a warrant 
based on an affidavit "so lacking in indicia 
of probable cause as to render official 
belief in its existence entirely 
unreasonable." Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 
at 610-611 (Powell, J., concurring in part); 
see Illinois v. Gates, supra, at 263-364 
(White, J., concurring in judgment). 
Finally, depending on the circumstances of 
the particular case, a warrant may be so 
facially deficient—i.e., in failing to 
particularize the place to be searched or the 
things to be seized—that the executing 
officers cannot reasonably presume it to be 
valid. Cf. Massachusetts v. Sheppard, post, 
at 988-991. 
468 U.S. at 922-23 (footnotes omitted). 
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The Leon good faith exception applies directly to this 
case. If Det. Boren's supporting affidavit was technically 
insufficient because it failed to indicate more precisely the 
reasons for believing that the stolen property was at defendant's 
residence, it was not so inadequate that the officers could not 
have acted in objectively reasonable reliance on the search 
warrant that was issued by a neutral and detached magistrate. 
None of the circumstances that the Supreme Court 
teaches would negate objective good faith are extant in this 
case. This is not a case in which the issuing magistrate was 
misled by knowingly or recklessly false information in an 
affidavitr or where the magistrate wholly abandoned his role as a 
neutral and detached judicial officer, or where the affidavit was 
"so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render the 
official belief in it existence entirely unreasonable." Leon, 
468 U.S. at 922-23. Cf. State v. Dronenburq, 781 P.2d 1303, 1305 
(Utah App. 1989) (where the supporting affidavit was "so lacking 
in indicia of probable cause" that the State conceded "it was 
unreasonable for the officer who prepared the affidavit to rely 
on a warrant issued on the strength of it"); Rowe, 806 P.2d 730 
(search warrant held invalid where officer requested 
authorization for nighttime search merely by placing an "X" in a 
box on a standardized form but provided no facts whatsoever to 
justify request). Quite the contrary, Boren prepared a very 
detailed affidavit which, in hindsight, could have and should 
have more precisely stated the basis for believing that the 
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stolen property was located at defendant's residence• 
Although Boren could have provided more details in his 
affidavit about the information he received from the informant, 
and thereby could have clearly established probable cause, Boren 
withheld that information in an effort to protect the informant's 
identity. Police reliance on informants is a well known fact of 
law enforcement. 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure, A 
Treatise on the Fourth Amendment, § 3.3(g) at 698 (2d ed. 1987). 
Further, if informants do not believe that the police will 
protect their identity once they provide information regarding 
criminal activity, the number of concerned citizens that are 
willing to come forward with information will surely decrease. 
Id. Therefore, protection of the identity of informants is an 
important policy and a serious concern to law enforcement 
officials. 
Because the informant feared retaliation from 
defendant, he or she asked Boren to keep his or her identity 
confidential. Boren respected that request, and he cautiously 
excluded from his affidavit specific information that would have 
jeopardized the confidentiality of the informant's identity (R. 
644). Boren was not trying to mislead the magistrate. Rather, 
as he indicated in his testimony, Boren recognized that as the 
amount of detailed information he provided in the affidavit 
increased, so did the likelihood that defendant would be able to 
discern the identity of the informant (R. 643-45). Boren had to 
strike a balance between providing enough information to 
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establish probable cause and the need to protect his informant 
from retribution. As such, Boren risked having a neutral and 
detached magistrate refuse to issue a search warrant in return 
for protecting the identity of his informant as best he could. 
In this admittedly close case, the magistrate decided 
to issue the warrant. Should this Court find that the affidavit 
was defective because of its lack of specificity as to the 
location of the stolen property, it should nevertheless uphold 
the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress. The 
defect in the affidavit is not so obvious that the officers "had 
no reasonable grounds for believing that the warrant was properly 
issued." Leon, 468 U.S. at 923. Consequently, Boren's reliance 
on the warrant issued was objectively reasonable, and the 
deterrent purpose of the federal exclusionary rule would not be 
served by excluding the challenged evidence under the facts of 
this case. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY EXCLUDED THE 
AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENDANT'S DECEASED FATHER-IN-
LAW BECAUSE THERE WAS OTHER EVIDENCE THAT WAS 
MORE PROBATIVE ON THE POINT FOR WHICH IT WAS 
OFFERED. 
The trial court properly excluded from evidence the 
notarized statement of defendant's deceased father-in-law, Harmon 
Meinhart, because the affidavit was not admissible under the 
residual hearsay exception as defendant asserts. (Br. of 
Appellant at 13). Rule 804(b)(5) of the Utah Rules of Evidence 
states: 
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A statement not specifically covered by any 
of the foregoing exceptions but having 
equivalent circumstantial guarantees of 
trustworthiness [will not be excluded] if the 
court determines that (A) the statement is 
offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) 
the statement is more probative on the point 
for which it is offered than any other 
evidence which the proponent can procure 
through reasonable efforts; and (C) the 
general purposes of these rules and the 
interests of justice will best be served by 
admission of the statement into evidence[.] 
Defendant offered Meinhart's affidavit to demonstrate 
that defendant could not have committed the June 16, 1991 
burglaries in Vernal, Utah because he was in Salt Lake City that 
night• On appeal, defendant asserts: 
The [trial] court, while it made no 
specific ruling as to either the reliability 
of the statement or the interests of justice, 
did rule that other probative evidence was 
available, to wit, the testimony of Clara Eva 
Meinhart. Her testimony was not identical 
[to] that of Mr. Meinhart in that she did not 
see the defendant in Salt Lake City on the 
night of June 16, 1991. She only heard the 
arguments. She believed that she heard the 
defendant's voice, but it was her husband who 
personally went outside and talked to the 
defendant. (TR. 322-340) 
(Br. of Appellant at 15). 
Defendant's assertion that it was Mr. Meinhart and not 
.Mrs. Meinhart who personally went outside and talked to defendant 
appears to be accurate. However, defendant's claim that "[Mrs. 
Meinhart] did not see the defendant in Salt Lake City on the 
night of June 16, 1991; Tslhe only heard the argumentsr,]" 
plainly misstates the record. In her testimony, Mrs. Meinhart 
indicated at least five times that she personally saw defendant 
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between 9:00 p.m. and 10:30 p.m. on the date in question (R. 
1143, 1144, 1150, 1154, 1155). (For the Court's convenience, 
these pages of the record are reproduced in Addendum C of the 
State's brief.) For instance, consider the following exchange 
between defendant's attorney and Mrs. Meinhart: 
QUESTION (by Mr. Williams): Okay. To allay that 
partially, I'm going to ask you, you said you heard them, meaning 
Bill and Vickie [Horton]? 
ANSWER [by Clara Eva Meinhart in her deposition, which 
was read at trial by her daughter]: Yeah. Vickie and Bill was 
over there fighting. 
QUESTION: Now, as far as hearing the voices, did you 
hear Bill Horton's voice? 
ANSWER: I seen both of them. I didn't have to hear 
them, I seen them. 
QUESTION: Where did you see them? 
ANSWER: They was out on the landing here, the porch 
landing by the motorcycle. 
QUESTION: Okay. And how long did you see them? 
ANSWER: How long? I stood and watched them for a few 
minutes. I was so disgusted with them I just stood and watched 
them. 
QUESTION: Okay. We'll leave it at that. Now, as far 
as the time that you looked out on the landing next to your home 
and saw them, was that before or after the [10:00 P.M.] news? 
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ANSWER: That was after the news, because I was just 
getting ready to go in and go to bed and — or I was just going 
to go in and go to bed. I went and got ready for bed and was 
laying there and they was screaming and carrying on. And I 
yelled at Harmon. And I told him, I says, get out of there and 
either tell them to shut up or I am going to call the cops and 
have them removed (R. 1143-45). 
The inescapable conclusion is that defendant's claim is 
predicated upon a misstatement of the record. Moreover, in 
addition to the testimony of Mrs. Meinhart, defendant presented 
three other witnesses who testified to his whereabouts on the 
night of June 16, 1991: Ray Bringhurst, a friend of defendant who 
was not charged in connection with any of the burglaries; Vickie 
Horton, defendant's wife; and Rochelle Schow, defendant's 
stepdaughter. With the exception of Mrs. Meinhart, all of the 
alibi witnesses testified that they spent June 16, 1991, in each 
others' company. The group started the day together at 
defendant's residence at about 10:00 or 10:30 in the morning. 
From defendant's residence, they went up east canyon for the day. 
After dusk, the group left the canyon and returned to defendant's 
residence in Salt Lake City (R. 294-322). Mrs. Meinhart 
testified that she saw defendant after he returned home from the 
canyon, at about 9:00 that night (R. 329). 
In light of the testimony of these four alibi 
witnesses, the affidavit of Harmon Meinhart was not admissible 
under rule 804(b)(5) because it was not "more probative on the 
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point for which it [was] offered than any other evidence which 
the proponent [could] procure through reasonable efforts • . . .M 
Utah R. Evid. 804(b)(5) (1992) (emphasis added). This Court 
should therefore uphold the trial court's decision not to admit 
the affidavit of Harmon Meinhart. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO CONTINUE HIS 
TRIAL. 
The trial court properly denied defendant's motion for 
a continuance. Although at first brush defendant's claim that 
the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to continue the 
trial so that defendant's "vital alibi witness," his mother-in-
law, could recover from surgery may hold some appeal, a closer 
examination of the facts demonstrates otherwise. (Br. of 
Appellant at 16). 
The decision to grant or deny a continuance lies within 
the discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on 
appeal absent a clear abuse of that discretion. State v. Oliver, 
820 P.2d 474, 476 (Utah App. 1991). In Oliver, the defendant 
moved for a continuance so a "key witness" would be allowed to 
have her trial first, before testifying at defendant's trial. 
Id. at 476. The Oliver Court noted that "[w]hen moving for a 
continuance, a party must show that denial of the motion will 
prevent the party from obtaining material and admissible 
evidence, that any additional witnesses it seeks can be produced 
within a reasonable time, and that it has exercised due diligence 
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in preparing for the case before requesting the continuance." 
Id. 
In the present case, defendant has failed to satisfy 
the first prong of the Oliver test because he was in fact allowed 
to present the evidence he wished to have admitted. While the 
State concedes that Mrs. Meinhart was unable to appear at the 
scheduled trial in person because of the need to recover from 
bladder surgery,7 her testimony was presented at trial through 
the reading of her deposed statement (R. 1137-57). Consequently, 
defendant was not prevented from obtaining or presenting any 
evidence. Rather, he was merely limited to presenting Meinhart's 
testimony by reading her deposition to the jury instead of having 
her testify in person. 
With respect to the second prong of Oliver, that the 
witness be available within a reasonable time, it is unclear 
exactly how long it would have been before Meinhart would have 
been able to testify in person. In his letter, Meinhart's 
physician indicates that following her surgery Meinhart would 
require "a recovery time of eight weeks due to the delicate 
nature of this surgery" and that "she [would] need a complete 
recovery time of a period of six months" (R. 167). Given the 
wide range of recovery times indicated by Meinhart's doctor, and 
the long duration of those recovery times, the trial court's 
7
 Defendant provided a letter from Meinhart's physician 
indicating that in his opinion "it was necessary for [Meinhart] 
to be excused from jury duty at this time" (R. 167). Presumably, 
Meinhart's physician intended to indicate that Meinhart would be 
unable to testify at trial. 
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refusal to grant defendant's motion is understandable. 
As for the third prong of the Oliver test, it appears 
that defendant exercised due diligence in preparing his case 
before requesting a continuance. Certainly, there is nothing in 
the record to suggest otherwise. 
Given the facts in the record before this Court, there 
is no basis to conclude that the trial court abused its 
discretion in denying defendant's motion for a continuance. 
Instead of waiting for an indefinite and likely lengthy period of 
time for Meinhart to recover from her surgery so that she could 
testify in person, the trial court ordered that Meinhart be 
deposed and her testimony read into the record before the jury. 
This was a reasonable solution to the problem presented and was 
well within the trial court's discretion. This Court should 
therefore uphold the trial court's denial of defendant's motion 
for a continuance. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO 
ALLOW INTO EVIDENCE A PHOTOGRAPH OF THE TRUNK 
OF THE CAR USED TO TRANSPORT THE STOLEN 
PROPERTY. 
The trial court properly refused to admit a photograph 
proffered by defendant to depict the size of the trunk of the car 
used to transport stolen property from the scene of the crime.8 
The photograph of the vehicle's trunk was taken by 
defendant's wife, Vickie Horton. As a review of the photograph 
8
 The photograph in question is defendant's exhibit #25, 
which is in the envelope located at page 170 in the record. 
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demonstrates, it was taken from the rear of the car, looking into 
the open trunk area. Inside the trunk is a hubcap that is 
leaning against the rim of the trunk. Although the hubcap was 
purportedly 14 inches in diameter, there is no ruler or other 
verifiable scale of measurement in the photograph. More 
importantly, the bottom portion of the hubcap and the floor of 
the trunk are not visible in the photograph. As such, there was 
no way to verify the actual size of the hubcap or whether it was 
resting on the floor of the trunk or some other object. 
In State v. Purcell, 711 P.2d 243 (Utah 1985), the Utah 
Supreme Court held, 
Under Rule 901(b)(1) of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence, foundation may be laid to 
authenticate evidence by testimony which 
establishes that the evidence is what the 
proponent claims it to be. In general, if a 
competent witness with personal knowledge of 
the facts represented by a photograph 
testifies that the photograph accurately 
reflects those facts, it is admissible. 
Purcell, 711 P.2d at 245. 
In this case, defendant's wife testified that the 
hubcap was 14 inches in diameter and that it was resting on the 
floor of the trunk. She also testified that the floor of the 
trunk was flat (R. 1125-26). 
Under Purcell, it appears that the trial court could 
have admitted the photograph. However, Purcell does not stand 
for the proposition that the photograph had to be admitted into 
evidence. In refusing to admit the photograph, the trial court 
did not specifically explain why it would not admit the 
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photograph in light of Horton's testimony. Nevertheless, given 
the context of the argument, it appears that the court was more 
persuaded by the State's argument that the photograph was 
unreliable than it was by the testimony of defendant's wife. 
Also, defendant already had introduced without objection another 
photograph of the car. That photograph was a side-view of the 
vehicle that depicted the entire car (R. 1124). The trial court 
also admitted another photograph of the car that depicted the 
back seat as viewed through the driver's side door (R. 1127-28). 
Finally, Vickie Horton testified that the trunk was, at most, 
only nine inches deep (R. 1127). Under the circumstances, the 
trial court did not err when it refused to admit defendant's 
exhibit #25. 
Even if the photograph should have been admitted, the 
trial court's refusal to do so was at most harmless error 
because, as explained above, the jury had other evidence from 
which it could determine whether the vehicle was large enough to 
accommodate all of the stolen property. See State v. Hamilton, 
827 P.2d 232, 240 (Utah 1992) ("'Harmless' errors are 'errors 
which, although properly preserved below and presented on appeal, 
are sufficiently inconsequential that we conclude there is no 
reasonable likelihood that the error affected the out come of the 
proceedings.'") (citations omitted). 
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POINT VI 
UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. S 76-3-401 (1990), AS 
INTERPRETED BY THIS COURT IN STATE V. SWAPP, 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN SENTENCING 
DEFENDANT TO ONE CONCURRENT AND SEVEN 
CONSECUTIVE PRISON TERMS THAT TOTALLED MORE 
THAN THIRTY YEARS. 
The trial court's imposition of a sentence with an 
aggregate total of more than 30 years did not violate Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-3-401(4) (1990)- Section 76-3-401(4) reads as follows: 
"If a court imposes consecutive sentences, the aggregate maximum 
of all sentences imposed may not exceed 30 years' imprisonment. . 
. .
,f
 Section 76-3-401(8) clarifies that " [t]his section may not 
be construed to restrict the number or length of individual 
consecutive sentences that may be imposed or to affect the 
validity of any sentence so imposed, but only to limit the length 
of sentences actually served under the commitments.w Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-3-401(8) (1990) (emphasis added). 
In State v. Swapp, 808 P.2d 115 (Utah App.)f cert, 
denied, 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991), which defendant concedes is 
controlling, this Court interpreted section 76-3-401 as not 
precluding the imposition of consecutive sentences that total 
more than thirty years, but merely restricting the actual time 
served to be no more than thirty years. Id. at 120. In the 
present case, therefore, the trial court did not violate section 
76-3-401 by imposing consecutive sentences that total more than 
thirty years. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing arguments, this Court should 
affirm defendant's convictions. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of September, 
1992. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
TODD A. UTZINGERV 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the 
foregoing brief of appellee was mailed, postage prepaid, to 
Alan M. Williams, attorney for appellant, 365 West 50 North, #W4, 
Vernal, Utah 84078, this 9£j^day of September, 1992. 
(Lis d. 
*¥t 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff, : AFFIDAVIT AND ORDER 
FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
vs. : 
WILLIAM GENE HORTON, : CASE NO. 
Defendant. : 
STATE OF UTAH } 
l 55 
COUNTY OF UINTAH } 
The Affiant undersigned being sworn states on oath;; 
1. I am a peace officer in the State of Utah. I have 
been a police officer for approximately 12 years. For all of those 
years I have been employed by the Vernal City Police Department. 
I have been assigned to the investigative services division where 
my duties there have included the investigation of various criminal 
offenses. During my career I have been involved in the 
investigation and/or arrests of at least 500 persons for various 
crimes. 
I attended the Utah Police Academy and am currently a 
certified police officer in the State of Utah. During my career, 
I have attended many hours of in service training which includes 
training into the investigation of property related crimes, 
forgeries and thefts. 
2. The property for which a search warrant is sought 
is described as follows: shoes/boots with matching sole prints to 
attached photo's taken at two crime scenes marked as: exhibits 
numbered 1, 2, and 3; cut and wrapped meat and meat products with 
matching retail price tags, described as red with black lettering 
various styles of print also white labels with ret trim and black 
lettering. Possibly dated packages from May 25, 26, 1991 and June 
15, 16, 1991; video tape movies, vhs format labeled "Wilkerson's" 
included but not limited to the following movie titles: 
Criminal Justice 
Lemon Sisters 
The Freshman 
Moon 44 
Child's Play 2 
Dead Reckoning 
In Too Deep 
Top Gun 
Hoosiers 
Cry Baby 
Here's Mickey 
Three Men and a Baby 
Stand and Deliver 
Huckleberry Hound 
Richochet Rabbit 
Good Morning Vietnam 
Daredevil Ducks 
Mickey's Christmas Carol 
Winnie the Pooh 
Mac and Me 
Crocodile Dundee 2 
Child's Play 
Sweetheart's Dance 
Things Change 
Eight Men Out 
Duck to the Future 
Mickey and the Beanstalk 
Rain Man 
The January Man 
Back Fire 
Ironweed 
Karate Kid 3 
Chip-N-Dale 
Bongo 
You Can Fly 
Nuts about Chip-n-Dale 
Hi Ho Sing Along 
Ben and Me 
Lost World Wonders 
Fun with Music Sing 
The Iron Triangle 
Pumkin Head 
High Spirits 
Physical Evidence 
Who's Harry Crumb 
True Believers 
Heather's 
Sherlock Hound 
Police Academy 6 
Stripped to Kill 2 
Sizzle Beach USA 
The Ranch 
Mississippi Burning 
Hamburger Hill 
Tequila Sunrise 
Under the Boardwalk 
Hero's Stand Alone 
Dino Star 
A Whisper to a Scream 
Pet Cemetery 
The Enforcer 
Long Days Journey into 
Night 
Northwest Passage 
Uncle Buck 
UHF 
Pink Cadillac 
Rio Grande 
Billy the Kid 
The Horror Show 
Bambi 
Moon Trap 
Sing 
Broadcast News 
Trust Me 
Working Girl 
Major League 
The Dream Team 
Earth Girls are Easy 
Sinbad of the Seven Seas 
Indiana Jones the Last 
Crusade 
The Fighting Kentuckian 
The Terror Within 
The Legend of Sleepy Hollow 
Farewell to the Kings 
Slaves of New York 
Little Big Man 
976-Evil 
Out of the Dark 
Criminal Law 
A Christmas Carol 
Checking Out 
Bill and Ted's Excellent 
Adventure 
Nintendo game cartridges, also labeled "Wilkerson's" including but 
not limited to the following game titles: 
Beetlejuice 
Wheel of Fortune 
Jack Nicklaus Golf 
Sesame Street (2 copies) 
Super Mario 3 
Deja Vu 
Total Recall 
Wizards and Warriors 
Vegas Dream 
Spot 
John Elway Quarterback 
Conan the Barbarian 
Metalstorm 
Pal-Mania 
Ghostbusters 2 
Narc 
Turbo Racing 
Flight of the Intruder 
Power Blade 
Teenage Mutant Ninja 
Turtles 2 
Duck Tales 
Double Dragon 
Dirty Harry 
Top Gun 
Ski or Die 
Touchdown Fever 
Archrivals Basketball 
Dr. Mario 
Road Blaster 
Days of Thunder 
Yo Noid 
Rad Racer 
Robocop Game 
numerous fishing lures, spinners, bait, fishing reels, flies and 
assorted tackle, items were tagged with reddish orange price 
labels. See attached invoice list from Kurt's Sport's Distributing 
to Wilkerson's Inc., invoice numbers 37013 and 37014. Invoices are 
marked as exhibit 4. 
several dozen cartons of various brands of cigarettes, including: 
Marlboro, Marlbox, Marlboro King, Marlboro Light, Camel, Camel 
filter, Camel Lights, Kool, Kool 100fs, Winston, Winston Light, 
Winston 100vs Salem Doral, Merits, and other brand names. 
retail packages of various types of nuts, candy and jerky labeled 
with reddish orange price tags. 
approximately four dozen hand towels in various colors including 
green, blue, pink, and yellow, all marked "Dinah Bowl" with an 
outline of a dinosaur on the towel• 
one Vector Two bowling ball, black in color. 
13 leather hand bags, with shoulder straps. 
various Cricket brand hair brushes and combs. 
Membco hair combs. 
Salon Essentials, nail care kits. 
3. The grounds for issuing a search warrant, as 
provided by Utah Code Annotated 77-23-2, are as follows: (a) the 
property was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed; (b) 
the property is evidence of illegal conduct. 
4. I have probable cause to believe, and do believe, 
that the property is located on the premises known or described 
as: William Gene Horton, address 1175 North 1500 West, Salt Lake 
City, Utah further described as: Red Brick, White Trim, Grey Roof, One 
Car Carport, White Sided Shed North of Carport, Skylight on East side of Roof, 
9 Pane Picture Window next to front door. Half Circle walkway to front door. 
5. The facts to establish the grounds for the issuance 
of a search warrant are: 
On the 8th day of July, 1991, your affiant received a call at 
the Vernal City Police Department from a person who identified 
themself and requested to remain anonymous. The person stated that 
they had information regarding a burglary of the Bowling Alley in 
Vernal that had recently been broken into. Your affiant confirmed 
that the Bowling Alley had in fact been broken into. The caller 
then asked if a business in Duchesne had been broken into and VCR's 
taken? Your affiant was unaware of such a burglary at that time. 
The caller stated that they had overheard a conversation 
between Vickey and Billy Horton. During this conversation the 
caller had overheard Billy Horton say the he, Billy Horton, had 
broken into the Vernal Bowling Alley. The caller also overheard 
Billy Horton say something about VCR9s from Duchesne. 
The caller advised your affiant that the suspect, Billy 
Horton, was released from the Utah State Prison about one year ago. 
The suspect was described as between the ages of 35 and 38 years 
of age. The suspect drove a blue, late model Ford Mustang, Utah 
License number 101 AKE, to the Vernal area to commit the crimes. 
The caller further informed your affiant that the suspect had been 
convicted of several burglaries in the past. The caller also 
informed your affiant that the suspect resides at 1175 North 1500 
West in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
After receiving the information from the caller your affiant 
called the Duchesne County Sheriff's Office and spoke with Sheriff 
Rick Harrison. Sheriff Harrison confirmed that "Wilkerson's" in 
Duchesne County had been broken into and missing were VCR's, 
recorded VHS movies, and Nintendo game cartridges. Upon receiving 
a copy of the Duchesne County Sheriff's report on the burglary of 
"Wilkerson's" your affiant noted that there were numerous fishing 
items taken including: tackle, rods, reels; video movies; VCR's; 
Nintendo games; snack foods; and other consumables. 
Your affiant was able to locate a driver's license issued to 
William G. Horton of 1175 North 1500 West in Salt Lake City, Utah, 
Further, your affiant was able to obtain a criminal history record 
on William Gene Horton, DOB: 12/05/53, said criminal history 
revealed several arrests and convictions for burglary and other 
crimes. 
At about 1300 hours on the same aforementioned date your 
affiant again received a phone call from the informant. The 
informant stated that the suspect had been in possession of several 
boxes of video tapes, Nintendo games, some VCR's and several boxes 
of packaged meat. The informant further stated that the suspect 
had been selling lots of cartons of Marlboro cigarettes. The 
informant stated that they thought that a person from Vernal may 
have been involved with the burglaries. The informant further 
stated that they would call back with that information if they were 
able to obtain the same. 
At about 1600 hours on the aforementioned date your affiant 
received a phone call from the same informant. The informant 
stated that they thought the other suspect from Vernal was named 
"Steven." The informant further stated that the suspect lived in 
Vernal and had been in prison with Billy Horton, the informant 
further described the second suspect as blond, stocky build, 
married with one child. 
At approximately 2230 hours on the aforementioned date your 
affiant again received a phone call from the informant. The 
informant stated that the second suspectfs name was Brian not 
Steven. The informant further relayed that Brian had just been 
released from prison and that his child was approximately 6 months 
old. 
On the 9th day of July, 1991, your affiant contacted Brent 
Cardall, Vernal Department of Corrections. Mr. Cardall reported 
that he only had two Brian's listed in his office: Brian Harris was 
in California and has been for several months; Brian Winslow was 
in the Utah Prison and released in March of 1990. Mr. Cardall 
described Brian Winslow as blond, stocky build, married with one 
small infant approximately 6 months old. Mr. Cardall further 
relayed that Brian Winslow has an extensive criminal history 
including the crime of burglary and other property crimes against 
a person. 
On the 9th day of July, 1991, at approximately 1400 hours your 
affiant received a phone call from the informant. The informant 
stated that the second suspect in Vernal was named Brian Winslow. 
The informant further advised your affiant that Billy Horton was 
in Vernal and was staying with Brian Winslow for the next two or 
three days. 
Based upon the statements of the above informant your affiant 
believes that at least some of the property listed above is at t 
above residence. 
Your affiant is not requesting a nighttime or no knock service 
authorization on this warrant• 
DATE SIGNED: 7//°/fi TIME SIGNED: £>/£& A^f 
This Affidavit was sworn to be before me by Affidavit on the 
date and at the time shown. 
IT IS ORDERED that a search warrant be issued for the articles 
and places described in the above affidavit, for an immediate 
search in the daytime and upon notice. 
Special instruction pursuant to 77-23-3(2), Utah Code 
Annotated: 
ADDENDUM B 
HARRY H. SOUVALL #4919 
Uintah County Attorney 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
152 East 100 North 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
Telephone: (801) 781-0770 
IN THE EIGHTH DISTRICT COURT, COUNTY OF UINTAH, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
Plaintiff, : AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
IN RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S 
vs. : MOTION TO QUASH WARRANT 
AND SUPPRESS EVIDENCE 
WILLIAM GENE HORTON, : 
CASE NO. 911800036 FS 
Defendant. : 
This matter came before the Court on the 7th day of 
November, 1991 on Defendant's Motion To Quash Warrant and Exclude 
Evidence. The Plaintiff was represented by Harry Souvall, Uintah 
County Attorney. The Defendant was present and represented by 
counsel, Alan M. Williams. Also present was Defendant, Dennis 
Session, who was represented by his attorney, Keith Chiara. The 
Court, having heard the testimony of the witnesses and the 
arguments of counsel, and being fully apprised thereof issues the 
following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
DISTRICT COURT 
UINTAH COUNTY, UTAH 
PEB 141992 
CK, CLERK 
DEPUTY 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Court has jurisdiction over the parties and the 
action, as this is a Motion To Suppress filed pursuant to Rule 
12, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
2. On or about the 16th day of June, 1991, the Dinah Bowl 
Bowling Alley in Vernal and two shops located therein, The Acute 
Cut and The Dinah Barber Salon, were also broken into and thefts 
occurred in each of the respective businesses. 
3. On or about July 8, 1991, Detective Joe Boren of the 
Vernal City Police Department, received a phone call from a 
confidential informant, who asked not to be identified. This 
informant stated to Officer Boren that they had information 
regarding the burglary of the bowling alley in Vernal, which had 
recently been broken into. The caller then asked if a business 
in Duchesne had been broken into, where VCR's had been taken. 
Detective Boren testified that the caller stated that he or she 
had overheard a conversation between Vickie and Billy Horton. 
During this conversation, the caller overheard Billy Horton say 
that he had broken into the Vernal bowling alley. The caller 
also overheard Billy Horton say something about VCR's from 
Duchesne. The caller then advised Detective Boren that the 
suspect, Billy Horton, was released from the Utah State Prison 
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about one year ago. The suspect was described as being between 
the ages of 35 and 38. The suspect drove a blue, late model Ford 
Mustang, Utah License Number 101AKE, to the Vernal area to commit 
the crimes. The caller further informed Detective Boren that 
the suspect had been convicted of several burglaries in the past. 
The caller further informed Officer Boren that the suspect 
resides at 1175 North 1500 West in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
4. Detective Boren was able to locate a drivers license 
issued to William G. Horton of 1175 North 1500 West in Salt Lake 
City, Utah. Detective Boren was also able to obtain a criminal 
history on William Gene Horton and said criminal history revealed 
several arrests and convictions for burglary and other crimes. 
5. Detective Boren further testified that later on the same 
day, he received a phone call from the informant. The informant 
stated the suspect had been in possession of several boxes of 
video tapes, Nintendo games, some VCRfs and several boxes of 
packaged meat. The informant further stated that the suspect had 
been selling lots of cartons of Marlboro cigarettes. The 
informant stated that they thought that a person from Vernal may 
have been involved with the burglaries and stated that they would 
call back with information if they were able to obtain the same. 
6. Detective Boren further testified that about three hours 
later, also on July 8, 1991, he received another call from the 
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same informant. The informant stated that they thought the other 
suspect was named Steven. The informant further stated that the 
suspect lived in Vernal and had been in prison with Billy Horton. 
The informant further described the second suspect as "blonde, 
stocky build, married with one child". 
7. Detective Boren testified that at approximately 22:30 
hours on the aforementioned date, he received another phone call 
from the informant. The informant stated the second suspect's 
name was Brian - not Steven. The informant further stated that 
Brian had been released from prison and his child was 
approximately six months old. 
8. On or about the 9th day of July, 1991, Officer Boren 
contacted Brent Cardall of the Department of Corrections. 
Cardall reported that he only had two Brians listed in his office 
- Brian Harris from California and Brian Winslow. Brian Winslow 
had been in the Utah State Prison and had been released in March 
of 1990. Brent Cardall described Brian Winslow as "blonde, 
stocky build and having one child approximately six months old". 
Mr. Cardall further relayed that Brian Winslow had an extensive 
criminal history, including the crime of burglary and other 
property crimes against a person. 
9. On July 9, 1991, at approximately 14:00 hours, Officer 
Boren received a call from the informant. The informant stated 
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that the second suspect in Vernal was named Brian Winslow. The 
informant further advised Officer Boren that Billy Horton was in 
Vernal and was staying with Winslow for the next two or three 
days. 
10. Based upon the above information, Officer Boren 
obtained a Search Warrant on the 10th day of July from the Third 
Circuit Court in Salt Lake County and from the Eighth Circuit 
Court in Vernal to search the homes of William Gene Horton and 
Brian Winslow. The search of William Horton's home uncovered 
evidence that appeared to have been taken from Dinah Bowl, The 
Acute Cut, and Wilkerson's in Duchesne. 
11. After being read his Miranda rights, Co-Defendant, 
Brian Winslow, confessed to the crimes and implicated the 
Defendant, William Horton, Dennis Sessions and Vickie Horton as 
participants in either the first set of burglaries on May 26, 
1991 and the second set of burglaries on June 15, 1991 and June 
16, 1991. Mr. Winslow1s confession and information regarding Mr. 
Hortonfs involvement in the crime were received by the officer 
after the warrant had been executed on the Horton residence 
12. Detective Boren states that he had information from the 
informant that the items identified as stolen property were seen 
in the driveway of the William Horton residence, but he failed to 
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include that information in the Affidavit of Probable Cause to 
obtain the Search Warrant for the residence of William G. Horton. 
13. At the Hearing, Officer Boren testified that the reason 
this information was not included was that the specific place and 
time of when the property was seen in the driveway could have 
been used to identify the informant if the Defendant had that 
information. Therefore, the fact that the stolen property was 
seen in the driveway of William Horton1s residence was excluded 
from the Affidavit. 
14. Officer Boren is an experienced officer with the search 
warrant process. He has drafted or assisted in the drafting of 
at least two hundred search warrant affidavits. He is familiar 
with the requirements for stating in the affidavit the location 
of the suspected contraband, and the factual basis for the 
request to search in that location. Officer Boren knew that he 
had left out that information in his affidavit. 
15. Officer Boren invited several officers who were 
investigating burglaries, which were not mentioned in the search 
warrant, to accompany him in the execution of the search warrant 
knowing that each officer's purpose was to search for items from 
those unrelated and unidentified burglaries. Officer Boren 
allowed this despite his knowledge that there was nothing in his 
affidavit or warrant that mentioned those burglaries. 
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16. Officer Boren included, in his list of suspected 
contraband attached to his affidavit, several items which had 
been taken during burglaries other than the ones described in the 
affidavit. 
17. Officer Boren withheld information which he had 
concerning the relationship of the informer to the defendant 
which may have had substantial impact on the determination of the 
credibility of that informant. He also withheld other details 
given to him by the informant. 
18. While Officer Boren had information which stated that 
contraband had been seen in the driveway of the Horton residence, 
he did not present any evidence as to when that evidence was seen 
nor if it was still there. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Affidavit in support of the warrant did not contain 
information as to why the property seized would be found at the 
William G. Horton residence and, therefore, there was 
insufficient probable cause, is a matter of law, to establish a 
probable cause for a search. 
2. The information received from the informant is 
sufficiently reliable and was verified by Officer Boren to be 
relied upon in the issuance of a warrant. Furthermore, there was 
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sufficient probable cause, based upon the information, to believe 
that William G. Horton had committed the crimes. 
3. Officer Boren withheld the necessary information to 
establish a nexus between the crime and the stolen property being 
at his residence because he was attempting to protect the 
identification of an informant. Had the information been 
included in the affidavit, there would have been sufficient 
probable cause to search the residence. The officer was acting 
in good faith in the request for a warrant and the execution of 
the warrant and the Court upholds the search under the Good Faith 
Exception search rule requirement established by the United 
States Supreme Court in The United States v. Leon. 
DATED this /%#day of February, 1992. 
(V^*^<^-
DENNIS L. DRANEY 
District Court Judge 
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ADDENDUM C 
"ANSWER: MY GRANDDAUGHTER COME OVER AND 
"MR. SOUVALL: OBJECTION, BEFORE YOU ANSWER THAT 
QUESTION, MRS. MEINHART, BECAUSE THERE IS GOING TO BE A COURT 
~ THIS IS GOING TO BE READ IN COURT, I NEED TO ENSURE THAT WE 
HAVE ADEQUATE FOUNDATION. I'M GOING TO MAKE AN OBJECTION FOR 
THE RECORD, FIRST OF ALL, FOR FOUNDATIONAL PURPOSES ON HOW YOU 
KNEW THAT THEY WERE OVER THERE, BECAUSE WE REALLY HAVEN'T 
HEARD THAT YET." 
"THE WITNESS: HOW THEY WAS OVER WHERE?" 
"MR. SOUVALL: AND SECONDLY, ANYTHING THAT YOUR 
GRANDDAUGHTER WAS TO SAY, I'M GOING TO OBJECT ON THE GROUNDS 
THAT IT'S HEARSAY. IN OTHER WORDS, IT'S WORDS OUT OF HER 
MOUTH THAT YOU'RE GOING TO TELL US, NOT YOUR OBSERVATIONS." 
"QUESTION: (BY MR. WILLIAMS) OKAY. TO ALLAY THAT 
PARTIALLY, I'M GOING TO ASK YOU, YOU SAID YOU HEARD THEM, 
MEANING BILL AND VICKIE?" 
"ANSWER: YEAH. VICKIE AND BILLY WAS OVER THERE 
FIGHTING." 
"QUESTION: NOW, AS FAR AS HEARING THE VOICES, DID 
YOU HEAR BILL HORTON'S VOICE?" 
"ANSWER: I SEEN BOTH OF THEM. I DIDN'T HAVE TO 
HEAR THEM, I SEEN THEM." 
"QUESTION: WHERE DID YOU SEE THEM?" 
"ANSWER: THEY WAS OUT ON THE LANDING HERE, THE 
PORCH LANDING BY THE MOTORCYCLE." 
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COMPUTERIZED TRANRPRTPT 
1 "QUESTION: OKAY. AND HOW LONG DID YOU SEE THEM?" 
2 "ANSWER: HOW LONG? I STOOD AND WATCHED THEM FOR A 
3 FEW MINUTES. I WAS SO DISGUSTED WITH THEM I JUST STOOD AND 
4 WATCHED THEM." 
5 "QUESTION: NOW, YOU SAID IT WAS BETWEEN 10:00 AND 
6 1 11:00 THAT NIGHT?" 
7 "ANSWER: WELL, IT WAS A LITTLE EARLIER THAT I SEEN 
8 THEM AND THAT. WHEN I WENT TO BED, IT WAS BETWEEN 10:00 AND 
9 11:00. IT WAS ABOUT 9:00 THAT T NOTICED THAT THEY HAD COME 
10 HOME." 
11 "QUESTION: OKAY. NOW, HOW DID YOU FIX THE 9:00 
12 TIME FRAME AS YOU LOOK BACK IN YOUR MIND?" 
13 "ANSWER: BECAUSE ~ HONESTLY, I CAN'T REMEMBER 
14 WHAT ~ I KNOW THAT I WATCHED ~ I ALWAYS WATCHED THE NEWS AND 
15 THAT, AND THAT COMES ON AROUND 10:00. THEN WE WENT — I WENT 
16 IN AND GOT THINGS READY. WELL, LIKE I AM SAYING, ROCKY CAME 
17 IN, RACHELLE, MY GRANDDAUGHTER, AND WAS VERY UPSET, WHICH SHE 
18 WILL BE THERE TO TESTIFY. AND 
19 "QUESTION: DID YOU HAVE A CONVERSATION WITH ROCKY 
20 ABOUT WHAT HAD GONE ON DURING THAT DAY?" 
21 "ANSWER: YES." 
22 "QUESTION: OKAY. WE'LL LEAVE IT AT THAT. NOW, AS 
23 FAR AS THE TIME THAT YOU LOOKED OUT ON THE LANDING NEXT TO 
24 YOUR HOME AND SAW THEM, WAS THAT BEFORE OR AFTER THE NEWS?" 
25 "ANSWER: THAT WAS AFTER THE NEWS, BECAUSE I WAS 
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"ANSWER: UH-HUH." 
"QUESTION: OKAY. NOW, MRS. MEINHART, VICKIE IS 
YOUR DAUGHTER; IS THAT CORRECT?" 
"ANSWER: RIGHT." 
"QUESTION: YOU'RE AWARE THAT VICKIE HAS BEEN 
CHARGED IN THESE BURGLARIES EVEN THOUGH SHE WOULD BE TRIED 
SEPARATELY FROM WILLIAM?" 
"ANSWER: UH-HUH." 
"QUESTION: YOU ALSO ARE AWARE, THEN, THAT YOUR 
TESTIMONY TODAY IN FAVOR OF MR. HORTON IS ALSO REGARDING HIS 
ALIBI AND WILL BE USED TO PROVIDE HER AN ALIBI AS WELL?" 
"ANSWER: THAT'S RIGHT." 
"QUESTION: ON THE EVENING IN QUESTION, WHAT WAS 
THE EXACT TIME YOU SAW BILLY AND VICKIE ARGUING?" 
"ANSWER: THIS WAS — NOW, JUST A MINUTE, RESTATE 
THAT SO I KNOW JUST WHAT YOU ARE SAYING." 
"QUESTION: OKAY. YOU TESTIFIED THAT YOU SAW THEM 
OUT ON THE LANDING, I BELIEVE IS THE TERM YOU USED, AND THEY 
WERE ARGUING?" 
"ANSWER: YEAH." 
"QUESTION: AND THAT YOU NOT ONLY HEARD THEM, BUT 
YOU ACTUALLY SAW THEM?" 
"ANSWER: YES." 
"QUESTION: NOW, WHAT TIME DID YOU SEE THEM?" 
"ANSWER: WHAT TIME DID I SEE THEM?" 
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"ANSWER: NOT TO MY KNOWLEDGE. ONLY YOU FOLKS THAT 
HAVE CONTACTED ME." 
"QUESTION: OKAY. WHAT 7-ELEVEN IS IT THAT YOU 
WORK AT?" 
"ANSWER: ON 13TH NORTH AND REDWOOD ROAD." 
"QUESTION: AND WHAT'S THE NAME OF YOUR DAUGHTER 
WHO CAME OVER HERE ON THE 16TH?" 
"ANSWER: THAT WAS LINDA ANDERSON." 
"QUESTION: FROM 9:00, ROUGHLY, WHEN YOU SAW THE 
ARGUMENT UNTIL 4:30 THE NEXT MORNING, DID YOU ACTUALLY SEE 
EITHER VICKIE OR BILL?" 
"ANSWER: WITH THE ARGUMENT?" 
"QUESTION: FROM THE TIME YOU SAW THEM ARGUING, 
WHICH YOU SAID WAS AROUND 9:00, UNTIL YOU SAW THEM, SAW VICKIE 
AT 4:30, 5:30 IN THE MORNING ACTUALLY, I BELIEVE?" 
"ANSWER: I SEEN THEM AT — BEFORE I WENT TO BED, 
THAT WAS AT 10:30." 
"QUESTION: OKAY." 
"ANSWER: WHEN THE NEWS WENT OFF, AROUND THAT TIME 
BETWEEN 10:00 AND 11:00, I WENT AND LOOKED OUT THERE. AND I 
WAS WAS VERY DISGUSTED. I WENT INTO BED AND THAT. AND THE 
NOISE PROCEEDED, AND THAT'S WHEN I HOLLERED AT MY HUSBAND, 
HARMON, TO COME IN. I TOLD HIM HE BETTER GET OVER THERE AND 
DO SOMETHING. AND THAT WAS THE LAST I SEEN ANY OF THEM UNTIL 
WHEN I GOT UP AT 4:30. KNOW THE THING WAS ON AND BETWEEN 5:30 
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AND QUARTER TO 6:00, I WOULD GO OVER AND KNOCK ON THE DOOR AND 
WAKE ONE OF THESE KIDS UP TO LET THEM KNOW I WAS ON MY WAY OR 
I WAS LEAVING TO GO TO WORK." 
"MR. SOUVALL: NO FURTHER QUESTIONS." 
"QUESTION: (BY MR. WILLIAMS) JUST TO RECAP THIS 
THING, MRS. MEINHART, THEY CAME — TO YOUR RECOLLECTION, THEY 
CAME HOME ABOUT 9:00?" 
"ANSWER: UH-HUH." 
"QUESTION: AND YOU SAW THEM OUT ON THE LANDING 
BETWEEN YOUR HOME AND THE HOME NEXT DOOR WHERE THE? LIVED?" 
"ANSWER: YEAH." 
"QUESTION: AND BY "THEY", WE'RE TALKING ABOUT BILL 
AND VICKIE AND JAY AND SOMEONE ELSE?" 
"ANSWER: RIGHT, AND THE KIDS." 
"QUESTION: AND AT ABOUT 10:30, THE NEWS WAS OVER 
AND YOU LOOKED OVER?" 
"ANSWER: RIGHT." 
"QUESTION: YOU WENT TO BED?" 
"ANSWER: YES." 
"QUESTION: AND SHORTLY AFTER OR SOMETIME 
THEREAFTER YOU SENT YOUR HUSBAND OUT TO QUIET THINGS DOWN?" 
"ANSWER: RIGHT." 
"QUESTION: AND ALL OF THOSE FOUR PEOPLE WERE 
ARGUING UNTIL YOUR HUSBAND GOT THEM QUIETED DOWN?" 
"ANSWER: RIGHT." 
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